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Foreign subsidiary performance and market efficiency effects are estimated and confronted 
in this paper using a rich firm-level panel for Polish manufacturing. Besides estimating total 
factor productivity, other performance measures are calculated and contrasted such as labor 
productivity, employment growth, markup levels and profitability. The findings show that 
foreign subsidiaries in Poland pay more (in wages and capital), earn less (in terms of 
profitability or ROA) and work harder (in terms of TFP and labor productivity) relative to their 
domestic counterparts. Foreign subsidiaries contribute with higher employment growth than 
other domestic and new firms. There is no evidence that foreign subsidiaries have 
significantly reduced market efficiency within the period of study and across the industries 
and entry modes investigated on average. Controlling for competition (which is found to have 
a negative effect on efficiency) the paper documents significant intra-industry spillovers. The 
effect is estimated to be twice as high within the foreign owned industrial communities as 
compared to the cross effect to domestic firms. 







The objective of the paper is to contribute to the literature on the impact of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) on firm performance in emerging markets. The paper distinguishes between 
the direct (within firm) and indirect (across firm within industry) effects emanating from the 
presence of a foreign ownership class, following the established traditions of the field. The 
direct effect is strong and well documented in the literature and often ascribed to the superior 
technology of multinational firms. Oppositely is the indirect effect disputed and prone for 
measurement problems and errors due to difficulties of disentangling e.g. competition and 
spillover (technology diffusion) effects.  
 
In relation to these overall research questions about the direct and indirect effects, the study 
seeks answers to some of the following questions using a panel data set for Poland: Is 
performance higher in foreign subsidiaries established as new firms (Greenfield)? Are foreign 
acquisitions as detrimental to market efficiency as the theoretical literature seems to 
suggest? Having the possibility to control for competition is there any evidence of a positive 
FDI spillover effect in the firm level panel for Poland?  
 
The paper seeks to contribute to the ongoing debate about FDI and the welfare effects of 
globalization. By building a bridge to the literature on privatization the study offers a more 
leveled approach to the question about direct impacts in emerging markets that underwent a 
rapid process of asset sales to owners abroad. Heterogeneity in terms of asset history (new 
vs. old assets equating with the differential entry modes of Greenfield and acquisition FDI) is 
often not controlled for in the literature that focuses on FDI.  
 
It is shown that a part of the foreign firm premia can be ascribed to the differential degree to 
which the ownership classes have been ‘burdened’ with assets that are inherited from the 
past. However, the study shows that this ‘burden’ more readily has been changed to one of 
future competitive advantage. Perhaps under the more capable but certainly also less 
resource restrained hands of foreign subsidiary managers.  
 
In terms of performance, the applied economic literature often focuses on total factor 
productivity or other measures of productivity such as labor productivity. But other measures 
of performance should perhaps receive more weight in combined considerations of the 




variety of performance measures the competitive process that foreign entry entails can be 
studied in more detail.  
 
The results offered here suggest that in the balancing act of ownership advantages, location 
advantages and disadvantages foreign subsidiaries may in fact pay more (in wages and in 
capital investment), earn less (in terms of ROA) and work harder (in terms of TFP). At the 
same time is there found no evidence, within the period of study that the higher capital 
investments have resulted in significant barriers to entry (in terms of increases in markup 
levels). But markups are found to grow much faster among foreign and new firms. 
 
By focusing on the broader within industry effects of the entry process of foreign firms in 
Poland during the period 1993-2004, the study provides some new evidence on spillover 
effects from FDI. Intra-industry spillovers are modeled with considerably more detail than any 
previous study, by combining firm level data with 3-digit industrial aggregates on number of 
competitors and foreign held market shares. 
 
The findings show that total factor productivity, markups and ROA may have an important 
common component that depends on the share of the market held by foreign firms. This 
effect, even though positive for all firms, is often found to have twice the impact on other 
foreign firms relative to the impact it has on domestically held firms. Other performance 
indicators are documented to have cross effects. For example increases in foreign market 
shares tend to reduce employment growth with domestic firms.  
 
Section 2 introduces the literature on FDI and host country benefits focusing on control 
factors of firm heterogeneity in the literature and the extent to which past studies have been 
able to disentangle competition from spillover effects. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 
provides descriptive statistical results on the foreign held and new firm premia. This is 
followed by dynamic panel regression results on the direct and indirect effects of foreign 
entry into Polish manufacturing. Section 5 concludes the paper by expanding on the results 
summarized here in the introduction in terms of potential policy implications of the study. 








Several theories offer explanations for why ownership classes should matter to performance. 
Multinational firms are expected to exhibit superior performance relative to local firms both 
according to the knowledge capital model proposed by Markusen (1995) based on theories 
of imperfect competition and the eclectic paradigm proposed by John Dunning (1981). In the 
eclectic paradigm the ownership advantages of the multinational firms are explained by the 
resource based theory of the firm (Hymer, 1970, Demsetz, 1988). Ownership advantages 
include not only firm-specific technology of the multinational firm, but also its access to better 
exploitation of scale economies through its established network and its access to other 
mobile network resources such as capital. However, the eclectic paradigm includes the 
perspective that subsidiaries are established in a weighing of the strength of the ownership 
advantages and the location advantages and disadvantages. In the eclectic paradigm the 
ownership advantages must be sufficient to outweigh any potential location disadvantage 
due to e.g. lack of developed social infrastructure, institutional or cultural favoritism, 
sensitivity of assets deployment to local skill and knowledge or due to intense rivalry in the 
host country (Anand and Delios, 1997).  
 
With background in theory it is therefore not surprising that foreign ownership is generally 
found to come with a performance premium. Typically the performance premium is found to 
increase with the development gap between host and home countries (see e.g. Görg and 
Strobl, 2001). In particular taxing, hostile and/or competitive environments the performance 
premium may be absent even though it has been rarely observed in practice. A study of the 
United States shows that it matters with whom the multinational firms are compared. 
Multinational firms investing in the United States are not exhibiting higher performance 
relative to those domestic counterparts that are themselves multinationals abroad (Corrado 
et al., 2008). 
2.1. What factors are usually controlled for? 
 
Several aspects of firm heterogeneity have been addressed in the literature to test for the 
robustness of the performance premium result. Standard controls include firm size, capital 
intensity and industry affiliation. The most stringent control test to date includes the 




acquisitions have been subjected to a rigorously controlled for comparator sample. In a study 
of Indonesia, Arnold and Smarzynska (2005) include controls for skill intensity and company 
history (age). Karpaty (2007) on acquisitions in Sweden includes controls for R&D intensity 
and region of the firm. Instead of structural variables such as industry and region some 
studies operate with a firm specific effect see e.g. Conyon et al., 2002. Other studies of 
mergers and acquisitions include dynamic aspects of entry, such as time having passed 
between the events studied and outcomes observed (see e.g. Berger et al., 2005, Conyon et 
al., 2002). Especially the literature on mergers and acquisitions has driven results towards 
the inclusion of a larger number of control factors. (Perhaps because the effects have been 
more difficult to discern and because of selection biases.) In practice controls reflect the 
particular objectives of the study, type of performance measurement and data availability. 
2.2. Should asset history not matter? 
 
The differential performance of ownership classes has been an important area of 
investigation among the new EU member states. The research has been driven by the 
objective to understand how FDI is affecting the restructuring process in the former socialist 
countries.  Related policy concerns are how to maximize technology spillovers for 
domestically held firms (see e.g. Damijan et al., 2008). Somewhat in overlap herewith is the 
question about the impact that privatization has on firm performance. However, little attention 
has been paid to the combined role of asset history and relative performance of firms from 
different ownership classes in this literature. This is peculiar and might be of some 
importance to better understand the developmental role of FDI under the specific 
circumstances facing many new market economies (trying to implement technological 
upgrading policies in combination with undergoing fundamental institutional changes). New 
meta-analytical studies on privatization (see e.g. Estrin et al., 2009) showing the combined 
roles of ownership and asset history in the restructuring process of former socialist countries 
suggest that some firm heterogeneity is left uncontrolled for in studies that only focus on 
ownership. New studies of internationalization in the banking industry include controls for 
both ownership and asset history (see e.g. Berger et al., 2005). 
2.3. Disentangling competition and spillover effects 
 
The topic of spillovers has been subject to particular scrutiny in the literature due to its high 
importance for policy makers and the overall welfare prospects of globalization for local firms 
and consumers. The main issue in spillover studies has been to investigate the sign of 
spillovers. A fairly high number of meta-analytical studies have become available. They try to 




different spillover effects across countries (see e.g. Görg and Strobl, 2001, Lipsey and 
Blomström, 2005, Crespo and Fontoura, 2007, Damijan et al., 2008). But neither the 
literature nor its overview provide us with any easy answer. 
 
A main underlying theme in some of the recent literature is that there is a need to disentangle 
the pure externality or what is rightfully a spillover effect from another effect which is due to 
the competitive pressure that the emergence of a foreign ownership class in the local 
economy exerts on domestic firms.  
 
Early studies of spillovers such as Haddad and Harrison (1993) and Kokko (1996) 
recognized the role of competition in their results but had to lump together spillovers with the 
competition effect in order to interpret their results.  
 
As better data and new techniques have become available more recent studies have tried to 
tackle the question about a separate competition effect and how it interacts with or differs 
from the ‘true’ spillover or externality effect of FDI. Some of these studies are reviewed in 
Table 1. 
 
The results in the available studies show a very low degree of homogeneity in several ways. 
None of the studies reviewed used the same concept of competition. Few of the studies used 
a dynamic concept of competition.  
 
What is perhaps common to the studies reviewed is that they all are concerned with 
combined events of trade and investment liberalization. (Note that Fernandes (2007) focuses 
exclusively on trade liberalization and does not include ownership controls). Only Romania 
and Hungary may be different in their timing since the Europe Agreements allowed for more 
sheltering from foreign trade competition relative to a very liberal policy of opening up to 
foreign direct investors in the early years of transition. Continued subsidies to locally held 
firms may have given room for a honeymoon effect in some transition countries. Both 
available studies for Eastern Europe report that the spillover effect declined over the period 
of study and spillover effects became negative in late transition due to stronger competition. 
In terms of timing of the two effects Barrios et al. (2005) argue for the reverse pattern, 
however, studying a much more mature market economy with a longer and different history 
of liberalization.  




None of the studies used competition as a dynamic control variable, but either studied 
competition in a way that made it impossible to disentangle from the spillover effect or 
studied it in a cross sectional way in order to observe how spillovers vary with the level of 
competition. Hence the studies have a problem that seems to be ontological before 
methodological in character due to the lacking theoretical conception of competition and 
spillover effects as separate phenomena in the overall process of competition. For example 
some studies argue for an additive effect (Barrios et al., 2005 and Altomonte and Pennings, 
2005). Other studies consider one effect (e.g. competition) as a precondition for the other 
(spillovers) or as multiplicative (e.g. Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999).  
 
Another but methodological problem of many studies (and all panel studies, see e.g. Frees, 
2005) is that of attrition or in other words how exit by firms are handled in the data collection 
procedures. It is possible that the competition effect is more likely to take a negative sign in 
studies that rely on data collected by local authorities (censor studies) that may follow exiting 
firms to the door. Oppositely in studies relying on cross sections at different points in time or 
databases such as Amadeus and Orbis published by Bureau van Dijk, the competition effect 
(or spillover effect if lumped together) may be more likely to show up as positive because 
only the surviving firms will be included in the published data sensitive to the specific time 




TABLE 1: Disentangling the competition and spillover effects from FDI     
Author(s) Country/Year(s)  Competition  proxy  Results     
Sjöholm  Indonesia    Herfindahl Index  Firms in high competition 
(1999)   1980 and 1991  ERP   (effective  industries benefited more 
rate of protection)  from spillovers 
Blomström  Indonesia    Dummy control  Spillovers are restricted to 
and Sjöholm  1991      for local firms    the non-exporters Ù 
(1999)         that are exporters  FDI increases productivity  
        in  domestic  firms  through 
        c o m p e t i t i o n  
Altomonte  Romania    No. of foreign   Spillovers are maximised 
and Pennings 1995-2001    entrants over    at a certain threshold level 
(2005)    time (dynamic)  after which the marginal effect of  
more foreign entrants become 
negative 
Barrios, Görg  Ireland     Net entry rate   Initially the competition effect is 
and Strobl  1972-2000    of new domestic  so strong that it deters entry, even- 
(2005)    firms (dynamic)  tually it is outweighed by a  
positive externality effect that 
crowds-in domestic entry 
Fernandes  Colombia    Herfindahl Index  Trade liberalization affects more 
(2007)   1977-1991    Turnover rates    strongly TFP in less 
competitive 
        industries 
Görg, Hijzen  Hungary    Dummy control  Local market oriented MNCs  
and Murakozy 1992-2003    for export oriented  have a negative impact on  
(2009)  MNCs     TFP levels with domestic firms  
     whereas  export  oriented  MNCs 








3. DATA  
 
 
The data used in the study comes from two main sources – the Amadeus Databank 
published by Bureau Van Dijk in Holland and information about number of active firms at the 
industry level including industry specific market shares obtained from GUS (National 
Statistical Office of Poland) in Warsaw. 
 
The firm specific data which is an unbalanced panel covering the period 1993-2004 was 
downloaded in 2005 as unconsolidated data (for the plant level). In this data there is the 
possibility to identify owners through information about the majority shareholder. Foreign 
firms are hence classified as those firms being held by a foreign majority shareholder. 
Domestic firms are classified when held by a domestic majority shareholder. Old firms are 
classified as those firms having been established prior to or in 1989 and oppositely for new 
firms after 1989.  
 
All the variables, exact calculations and their sources are summarized in Table 2. 
 
The panel dataset is bound together by a number of identifiers. The main identifier in the 
panel is the individual plant. The firm level data is combined with the industry level data using 
industry codes (NACE) at the 3 digit level.  
 
Sample characteristics on the main classifying variables are shown with Table 3. (More 
descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients are reported in Appendix 2.) This is a 
snapshot in time of the panel. The year 2000 has the highest number of observations, 
whereas the panel tends to become more unbalanced around the start and end dates. 
Juxtaposing the firm level data with GUS industry level data (here at the 2 digit level) gives 
an estimation of sample representation (last column). On average the sample is drawn 
representing half of industry sales. Generally the least and most concentrated industries 
have lower representation or in some industries unknown representation. In industries or 
subgroups of industries with only a few active firms GUS is not allowed to publish the sales 
data. From an industrial economics perspective a firm level panel of this type will typically 
cover all or some of the main actors in the industry, whereas the smaller fringe firms will be 
left out. Hence results will reflect those of the industry main actors, whereas knowledge 
about the typically more adaptive fringe will remain unknown. In terms of competitive 




including information about the total number of competitors in each industry (at the more 
detailed 3 digit level). Other measures of competition such as the Herfindahl index or 
concentration ratios cannot be calculated since firm level data is only available as a sample. 
(Exact stratification of which remains uncertain since most of the population characteristics 
are unknown). 
 
TABLE 2: Overview of study variables                                                                                               
   
COMP  The number of firms active at the 3-digit NACE industry level according to 
aggregate GUS census data. 
CAPITAL   Real capital assets of the firm approximated using the book value of total fixed 
assets in 1,000 PLN from the Amadeus Databank. The GDP deflator from the 
World Bank’s WDI Database is used to calculate real values. 
DOM  A dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the firm is owned by a domestic 
majority shareholder according to the Amadeus Databank 
FOR  A dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the firm is owned by a foreign 
majority shareholder according to the Amadeus Databank. 
FORMSH   The share of turnover at the 3-digit NACE industry level with foreign owned 
    firms according to aggregate GUS census data. 
KL  Capital intensity calculated as capital over number of employees (labour). 
LABOUR   Number of employees of the firm using year end data from the Amadeus 
Databank. 
MATCOST   Real materials used in production in 1,000 PLN from the Amadeus Databank. 
The GDP deflator from the World Bank’s WDI Database is used to calculate 
real values. 
MARKUP  Calculated as total sales divided with total cost (total sales less EBIT) from the 
Amadeus Databank as an approximation to the ratio of price over average 
cost. 
NEW  A dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the firm was established after 
1989. 
OLD  A dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the firm was established prior to 
or in 1989. 
ROA  Return on assets, calculated as EBIT over total assets taken from the 
Amadeus Databank. 
TFPOLS  Total factor productivity estimated using ordinary OLS on the pooled dataset 
(see Appendix 1). 
TFPLP  Total factor productivity estimated by controlling for the simultaneity bias 
between inputs and productivity shocks called the Levinsohn-Petrin procedure 
(see Appendix 1). 
SALES   Real output of the firm approximated using sales data in 1,000 PLN from the 
Amadeus Databank. The local GDP deflator from the World Bank’s WDI 
Database is used to calculate real values. 
YL  Labour productivity calculated as sales over number of employees (labour). 
 
 
From Table 3 follows an important descriptive statistic about the data. Foreign entrants in 
Polish manufacturing fall with approximately one third of firms as acquisitions of existing 
assets (old firms). Oppositely is the domestic population of firms covered with the sample 




More descriptive statistics are given in the subsequent Section 4 on performance differences. 
Simple descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation coefficients are reported in Appendix 2. 
 
The various performance measures used in the study capture different aspects of firm 
efficiency, growth and/or host country welfare. Total factor productivity growth (or TFP 
growth) is the most universally applied measure of efficiency advancements in economics. 
TFP captures the efficiency with which firms are able to transform inputs into outputs. Firms 
with higher TFP (TFP growth rates) are typically considered to have a higher level of firm-
specific technology (technological progress). However, other aspects of firm organization 
including worker motivation may be important. Hence technology should be considered not 
only to include the hardware of the organization but also the software and perspiration of its 
workers. (Appendix 1 shows the exact equations that were used to calculate total factor 
productivity using OLS (TFPOLS) and the Levinsohn-Petrin procedure in STATA (TFPLP)).  
 
The markup level as opposed to TFP says something about the market power of firms when 
selling their products. It measure the distance between the average cost of producing and 
the sales price. This measure of performance may be strongly affected by the number of 
competitors in the industry and other factors such as product quality and differentiation 
practices. 
 
Whereas TFP is really an efficiency measure that should not reflect market valuation, 
unfortunately the two measures of performance are closer to each other than they should be. 
TFP should ideally be measured using only information about quantities of inputs and 
outputs. However, some inputs are measured using prices since there is no other way of 
counting up capital than by using its worth in monetary terms. The same is true for the 
composite of materials. Output of the firm is measured with sales since outputs nor prices 
are uniform enough even at the firm level to be accounted for in any other way.  
 
Both measures may be seriously flawed when most of the sales of a subsidiary take place at 
transfer prices on an intra-firm basis. Estimating the production function in its gross form 
(materials included) may help to reduce this bias, e.g. if transfer pricing is to the benefit of the 
subsidiary it will show up as higher material productivity and vice versa. 
 
Labor productivity growth is a weaker but complementary measure to TFP growth and should 
include control for capital intensity when applied. It estimates the efficiency of the average 
worker employed by the firm. 




Labor or employment growth is a performance measure that shows whether individual firms 
are growing or shrinking over time. Better performing firms are typically expected to grow and 
vice-versa, except in situations where there may be increasing industry concentration or in 
periods where firms restructure by increasing their specialization. 
 
Return on Assets (ROA) measures performance from the perspective of the capital owners 
of the firm. As it is calculated in this study (EBIT over total assets) it shows the gross return 
to the investment of capital with the firm. It is directly comparable across firms but is gross in 
the sense that it does take into account neither the cost of borrowing nor the opportunity cost 
of investing the capital. 
 
All the performance measures are related. For example, assuming constant demand an 
increase in market power (markup levels) may come about by shrinking the size of 
production (and hence employment) and/or reducing the cost and/or increasing efficiency. 
Increases in market power are associated with higher levels of profitability or ROA and lower 
levels of competition in the static perspective of market efficiency. It is important to note that 
market power through markup levels and efficiency may co vary both in a positive and 
negative way. Technological progress may be equally likely to be associated with a market 
structure that becomes more or less concentrated over time (Demsetz, 1973). Similarly 
under expanding  
demand or rapid technological progress, markup levels may be positively correlated with 
competition. In the static market efficiency perspective consumer welfare goes up with a 
lowering of market power. However, in a dynamic perspective (some) market power is not 
necessarily bad if it leads to technological progress through a cyclical process of innovation 




TABLE 3:  Basic sample characteristics                                           
Year=2000  
No. of firms      Foreign   D o m e s t i c   Sample/Population 
   N e w    O l d    N e w    O l d   ( %   o f   t o t a l   s a l e s )  
Industry 
 
15  -  Food   71   39   161   102   47 
16  –  Beverages**  -   4   -   2   48 
17  –  Textile   13   3   17   44   63 
18  –  Clothing   13   5   21   16   27 
19  -  Leather   4   1   11   11   36 
20  –  Wood   18   1   30   26   52 
21  -  Paper   20   11   23   10   80 
22  –  Printing   31   1   32   26   97* 
23  –  Fuel**   2   -   4   6   28 
24  -  Chemical   26   14   29   49   63 
25  –  Plastic   47   8   47   27   43 
26  –  Mineral     42   32   40   46   63 
27  –  Metal   6   4   10   34   62 
28  -  Metallurgy  34   10   70   66   51 
29  –  Machinery    23   18   54   107   48 
30  –  Office  mach.**  1   -   4   1   52 
31  –  Electrical  mach.  26   15   30   23   53 
32  –  Radio,  TV  11   1   12   11   66 
33  –  Precision  mach.  3   1   8   9   20* 
34  –  Vehicles     26   11   7   23   50 
35  –  Other  transp.  5   5   13   18   53 
36  –  Furniture,  other  31   6   26   26   48 
37  –  Recycling  3   2   5   4   64 
Total manufacturing 456    192    654              687    50   
*The industry level data that the sample totals are compared with is not reliable for these industries because  
 data is not released by GUS when concentration could lead to identification of individual firms.     
**These industries have been excluded from the calculations due to insufficient number of observations.    
Source: Amadeus Database, Bureau Van Dijk, Holland and National Statistical Office of Poland (GUS).  
        
4. Regression results 
 
 
The first method used to present the statistical results of the analysis falls in between 
descriptive statistics and regression analysis. Simple structural equations are adopted 
treating the data as a pool towards describing the basic dimensions of the sample and 
focusing on the characteristics that are of main interest. Subsequently the data is analyzed 
using more advanced panel data regression techniques. Simple descriptive statistics are 
reported in Appendix 2.  
 




4.1. Basic performance differences 
 
In Table 4 the foreign owned firms are compared with the domestically owned firms on a 
number of basic variables, ratios and for the specific performance variables that are used 
subsequently as dependent variables in the panel regression analysis. Each column in Table 
4 gives a different estimate of the premium of being a foreign owned firm. The first column 
compares e.g. level in sales without controlling for firm-specific characteristics such as 
industry affiliation. The second column compares again the level in sales but through a 
simple structural equation that controls for the impact that covariates such as industry and 
year may have on the reported variable. Finally in the last column is shown the foreign 
premium for the annual growth rate in sales, again using the same structural equation as in 
column 2 to control for other relevant covariates. The first row in Table 4 reads: foreign 
owned firms in a simple comparison are found to have sales that are on average 84 % higher 
than that of domestically held firms, controlling for basic characteristics of each data point 
(industry and year). This premium shrinks only a little bit to 80%. Finally foreign owned firms 
register an annual growth rate in their sales that is 8% higher than the growth rate of 
domestically owned firms. 
 
From Table 4 it is seen that the sample for Poland confirms what is found for a host of other 
foreign-domestic samples in emerging markets. Foreign firms are on average larger, much 
more capital intensive (even though this is slowly changing since the growth rate in the 
capital labor ratio is lower than that of the growth rate in the domestically held firms) and 
more productive (when measured using labor productivity and some of the measures of total 
factor productivity). The next two rows show that foreign firms pay considerably higher 
wages. The sales to material cost ratio would suggest (even though a very rough measure) 
that foreign subsidiaries are more specialized compared to their domestic counterparts. This 
is perhaps not surprising remembering that the domestic part of the sample contains a 




TABLE  4:  Foreign  firm  premia          
Variable:      Level I *  Level II**  Growth rate***       
log  SALES      0.90   0.86   0.11 
log  LABOUR    0.27   0.25   0.03 
log  SALES/LABOUR   0.64   0.62   0.07 
log  CAPITAL/LABOUR  1.00   0.95   -0.02 
log  WAGES/LABOUR  0.37   0.38   0.04 
log  SALES/MATCOST  -0.13   -0.12   -0.01 
log  TFPOLS    -0.05   -0.04   0.02 
log  TFPLP    0.53   0.42   0.08 
MARKUP    0.003   -0.002   0.02**** 
ROA     -0.40   -0.41   0.02****     
*The simple level difference in the variable by ownership group. 
**The level difference in the variable by ownership group controlling for the covariates of industry and year of the 
observation. 
***The growth rate difference in the variable by ownership group controlling for the covariates of industry and year 
of the observation. 
****For the MARKUP and ROA is shown the point difference instead of the growth rate.       
 
The table offers some new evidence on the foreign firm premia. Markup levels with foreign 
subsidiaries are not higher than with domestically owned firms when other covariates are 
controlled for. Foreign owned firms in Polish manufacturing are on average much less 
profitable compared to their domestic counterparts. Even though these results are 
unexpected they give an indication of the severity of competition facing foreign subsidiaries 
in the emerging market context such as the Polish (and with respect to profitability also that 
large upfront investments are being made during the period of study). 
 
Table 5 provides now comparative evidence on the new firm premia – that is instead of 
focusing on ownership the focus is instead on the history of assets for groups of firms. As 
mentioned in the data section firms are classified as new when their asset history is 
exclusively associated with the transition to a market economy in Poland after 1989. 
According to Table 5, new firms are smaller and less capital intensive and generally grow 
faster. In the period covered they are found to be more specialized and productive compared 
to firms with inherited assets even though on average the growth rate in productivity is lower 
than in the old firms undergoing restructuring. The new firms have generally somewhat 
higher markups than old firms and are found to be much more profitable than firms with 
inherited assets. 




Overall the descriptive statistics presented in this section confirm a number of factors about 
the foreign firm premia, but point to a number of intervening factors in this relationship 
between ownership and performance. For example, the much higher capital intensity in 
foreign owned firms might explain their superior performance in terms of total factor and 
labor productivity. But when looking at ROA, the higher overall efficiency comes at significant 
cost in terms of lower efficiency of the invested capital. The descriptive statistics show that 
the institutional changes associated with the privatization process is important to control for 
when investigating firm performance in an emerging market context such as the Polish. 
Descriptive statistics on the new firm premia suggest that some firm heterogeneity is left 
unexplored in studies of this type. 
 
TABLE  5:  New  firm  premia           
Variable:      Level I*  Level II**  Growth rate***       
log  SALES    -0.61   -0.46   0.08 
log  LABOUR    -1.06   -0.86   0.08 
log  SALES/LABOUR   0.45   0.39   0.01 
log  CAPITAL/LABOUR  -0.07   -0.06   -0.002 
log  WAGES/LABOUR  0.09   0.04   0.03 
log  SALES/MATCOST  -0.22   -0.16   -0.01 
log  TFPOLS    0.43   0.42   -0.02 
log  TFPLP    -0.02   0.04   0.02 
MARKUP    0.015   0.017   0.002**** 
ROA     0.46   0.40   -0.09****     
*The simple level difference in the variable by ownership group. 
**The level difference in the variable by ownership group controlling for the covariates of industry and year of the 
observation. 
***The growth rate difference in the variable by ownership group controlling for the covariates of industry and year 
of the observation. 
****For the MARKUP and ROA is shown the point difference instead of the growth rate.       
 
4.2. Dynamic panel regression results on owners and assets 
 
The statistical results presented above despite controlling for basic covariates suffer among 
other from the disadvantage that the data is not structured as a firm-level panel but instead 
treated as a pool of common data only labeled with some industry codes and time 
specifications. 
 
Several regression techniques can be used to exploit the panel character of the data. For 




because of the structural character (time invariant) of the main explanatory factors especially 
a fixed effect approach is less useful as the effects to be observed will tend to be suppressed 
by the fixed effects. The first difference approach is useful if there are a lot of time variant 
explanatory factors. However, that is not the case here since the number of explanatory 
factors are somewhat limited as most of the dependent variables are already secondarily 
derived using such explanatory factors. 
 
Instead is used a dynamic panel data approach. The dependent variables are specified as 
dynamic (since we are more interested in their growth rates than their levels). To account for 
the time series dimension is adopted the lagged dependent variable approach. The main 
effects are ownership classes (foreign and domestic) and asset histories (new and old). The 
size of firms is controlled for by inclusion of the number of employees as lagged variable. 
Industry, region and year effects are controlled for as dummy fixed effects. Finally to account 
for the cross section dimension a locally weighted equation (FGLS) is used. This 
specification allows for an error term component that is heteroscedastic or specific to each 
firm (cross section). 
 




 TABLE 6: Foreign and new firm premia in the panel                             
Z-statistics are reported in parenthesis 
 
Dependent variable:  dlogTFPLP    dlogYL dlogL     dMarkup   dROA     
Ownership effects: 
FOR    0.14***   0.12***   0.011***  0.011***  -0.07*** 
   (39.62)   (40.97)   (8.49)   (13.45)   (-10.42) 
Asset effects: 
NEW    0.02***   0.04***   0.03***   0.005***  -0.00 
   (5.95)   (17.65)   (23.62)   (7.66)   (-0.03) 
Controls: 
LDV(-1)
A    -0.21*** -0.15*** -0.05*** -0.67*** -0.60*** 
   (-72.57)  (-74.69)  (-72.76)  (-141.38)  (-104.04) 
Log LABOUR (-1)
B  0.03***  -   -    -0.01***  -0.15*** 
   (20.19)       (-19.73)  (-37.86) 
Log  (CAP/LAB)(-1)  -   0.03***   0.03***   -   - 
     (28.54)   (74.59) 
INDUSTRY     Yes***   Yes***   Yes***   Yes***   Yes*** 
REGION   Yes*   Yes   Yes***   Yes***   Yes* 
YEAR    Yes***   Yes   Yes***   Yes*   Yes*   
Obs.    8,321   8,363   8,363   8,333   8,333 
χ
2    54,685   528,350  389,131  157,454  35,081   
Notes 
A  Note that the lagged dependent variable (LDV) is not the last period growth rate but the last period level. 
*/**/..  The estimated parameter is significant at the *10 percent level ** 5 percent level  
  *** 1 percent level                                                                   
 
From the regression results it is verified that foreign ownership and newness corroborate 
towards the same effects. This is seen in a simple way in Table 6, because one effect is 
positive still, while the other is controlled for. For example, foreign ownership has a 
performance premium that is independent of newness. The same is true for new firms. They 
have a performance premium that is independent of foreignness. This also implies that the 
best performers (except with respect to ROA) are the new foreign owned firms. The worst 
performers are the old domestic firms. Concerning all productivity related performance 
measures (TFP, YL and markup) ownership matters relatively more compared to the impact 
that asset history has on performance. With respect to employment growth, asset history is 
more important since new firms grow faster than the old restructured firms. For profitability 
the result is the opposite with the foreign owned firms being the least profitable whereas 
asset history alone has a weak influence on profitability. 
 
Asset history in terms of firms endowed with inherited assets place a burden on firm 
performance. However, a burden that may be specific to the period of study and a reflection 
of the very intensive restructuring process that these firms are undergoing.  
 
In previous Tables 4 and 5, it was reported that static market efficiency is not impacted by 




especially in the new foreign owned firms. But also other factors (and besides those of 
industry and region already controlled for) such as market structure, differentiation practices 
and export intensity may be quite important in explaining markup levels.  
 
Despite the lower efficiency levels, the investment in old firms has been more profitable 
relative to establishment of new firms when the owner is foreign (not shown). It is only with 
respect to ROA (profitability) that the average ranking for ownership classes and asset 
histories is generally not confirmed. This might indicate that Greenfield investments abroad 
are more risky because of the downsides of location disadvantage. It might be an indication 
of the significant capital investment involved and that the profitability from investment in 
capacity has a longer time horizon. The difference in ROA could also be explained by cost of 
capital differences, e.g. that the capital of the old firms has been acquired at a certain rebate. 
4.3. Estimating competition and spillover effects 
 
In Table 7 the same regressions are run as with Table 6, but now including the estimation of 
spillover effects using the proxy SHFOR and controlling for competition with the variable 
COMP. Results are reported for the full sample, but the spillover proxy is interacted with the 
ownership groups to observe the differential impact that the emergence of the foreign 
ownership class has on other foreign and domestic owners. Only the latter effect is what is 
typically associated with the spillover effect in studies of this type. However, foreign 
subsidiaries themselves may benefit from the spillovers from other foreign subsidiaries. The 
competition proxy is included in an attempt to control for the independent effect that 
competition has on performance.  
 
The hypothesis is that either effect could be positive or negative depending on the specific 
situation. The sign of the competition effect will depend both on changes in demand and 
static and dynamic changes in firms’ average cost curves. Even in a scenario of constant 
demand and cost conditions the entry effect may be ambiguous for the competition effect. 
For example, if firms compete in Cournot, TFP and markups should go down because of 
declining prices. Oppositely, if firms compete in Bertrand, there may not be room for a price 
decline, hence hampering TFP if firms already operate at MES and leaving markups 












TABLE 7: Competition and spillover effects in the panel         
Z-statistics are reported in parenthesis 
 
Dependent variable:  dlogTFPLP    dlogYL   dlogL     dMarkup   dROA 
Ownership effects: 
FOR    0.10***   0.10***   -0.02***  0.020***  -0.16*** 
   (15.79)   (17.69)   (-5.64)   (11.81)   (-11.44) 
Asset effects: 
NEW    0.03***   0.05***   0.04***   0.014***  0.12*** 
   (8.91)   (20.66)   (26.59)   (18.86)   (18.07) 
Controls: 
LDV(-1)
 A    -0.22*** -0.17*** -0.05*** -0.711***  -0.18*** 
   (-76.63)  (-82.13)  (-72.22)  (-175.89)  (-43.24) 
LABOUR  (-1)   0.03***  -   -    -0.005***  -0.18*** 
   (18.15)       (-15.85)  (-43.24) 
Log  (CAP/LAB)(-1)  -   0.03***   0.03***   -   - 
     (26.95)   (50.52) 
INDUSTRY     Yes***   Yes***   Yes***   Yes***   Yes** 
REGION   Yes***   Yes***   Yes***   Yes***   Yes*** 
YEAR    Yes***   Yes***   Yes***   Yes***   Yes*** 
Spillovers: 
D(Log  COMP)   -0.05***  0.12***   -0.10***  0.001   0.05** 
   (3.06)   (10.53)   (-17.15)  (0.49)   (1.81) 
FORMSH   0.09***   0.07***   -0.05   0.084***  0.12*** 
*DOM    (8.09)   (8.49)   (-12.56)  (37.44)   (5.82) 
FORMSH   0.21***   0.14***   0.01   0.055***  0.24*** 
*FOR    (16.54)   (10.57)   (1.08)   (14.81)   (7.60)   
Obs.    6,991   7,030   7,030   7,009   7,009 
χ
2    1,318,983  4*10
7   116,804  7,7*10
10  73,152 
Notes 
A  Note that the lagged dependent variable (LDV) is not the last period growth rate but the last period level. 
*/**/..  The estimated parameter is significant at the *10 percent level ** 5 percent level  




However, competition in itself may force firms to work harder or look for new markets which 
could give a positive effect. 
 
The spillover effect is hypothesized in most situations to be close to zero or positive. Only in 
rare situation should it be negative. For example, bad product reputation from a specific firm 
may spill over negatively on all other producers in the same industry. We could also imagine 
other types of negative spillovers associated with adoption of suboptimal or flawed methods 
of production (industry fads) which may spill over on other firms before their inherent 
problems are discovered. But in most cases productivity spillovers or technology diffusion 




not sufficient it can also be negative. (In which case the effects cannot be separated on 
methodological grounds). 
 
Focusing on the results for efficiency and employment growth (dlogTFPLP and dlogL) in 
Table 7, it is seen that competition has a negative effect on these performance measures.  
Note that in the final results competition was measured with the growth rate in net entrants. 
(The level of competition also gave a negative result but was only weakly significant.) 
Oppositely does labor productivity respond positively to increases in competition in Polish 
manufacturing. This combined evidence would suggests that competition made firms invest 
in capacity but maybe reducing the ability of the individual firm to operate at MES. The 
results for profitability (ROA) indicate that reverse causality may be at work since it should be 
unilaterally negative in view to the other evidence (but maybe what is registered is that 
profitable industries attract more new entrants). The same regression was run with the 
growth rate in net entrants (∆ (Log COMP)) and the spillover terms lagged one period. The 
sign and significance of the results for TFPLP were maintained and strengthened. Oppositely 
for ROA did the sign change to negative and the size and significance of the estimated 
parameter increased considerably (not shown).  
 
The spillover effects across all performance measures are unilaterally positive except with 
respect to long run performance or the growth of domestic firms. The expansion of foreign 
market shares in Poland is found to have positive spillovers on the efficiency of domestic 
firms and their markup and profitability levels. But foreign investment does have some 
crowding out effect on employment with domestic firms. Estimating the same effects among 
the foreign producers themselves suggest that technology diffusion or spillovers are much 
more rapid within the foreign producer community. Again, and due to the inaccuracy of the 
technology spillover proxy, the result may be caused by a third unobservable factor which 
could be the better ability of foreign owned firms to invest in the ‘right’ or expanding 
industries. Robustness checks were made as explained above by differencing out and 
lagging the spillover proxy one or two periods (not shown).  The positive spillover results 
were maintained unilaterally across all specifications again with the exception of employment 
growth with domestic firms. However, only the technology spillover effect on domestic firms 
maintained its significance whereas only the profitability spillover effect maintained its 








5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
The quantitative results obtained in the paper have already been summarized in the 
introduction part. The conclusion will therefore focus on addressing the potential policy and 
research implications of the study.  
 
Helping firm performance in emerging markets is a balancing act between optimizing both 
subsidiary and local firm performance. One cannot be understood without the other as a long 
tradition of research on FDI and firm performance in this context shows. To optimize 
subsidiary and local firm performance requires attention to be paid both to the direct and 
indirect impacts of FDI on firm performance. This problem is very similar to the fundamental 
problem of economic growth being that of finding institutional setups that can give incentives 
for innovation, while not sheltering innovators too much from the competitive process that 
involves both competition per se and technology diffusion. Helping foreign subsidiary 
performance in emerging markets will in most cases also have a positive effect on local 
firms. So in the conclusion I will try to focus on areas where policy-makers in the new or 
emerging market economies can set in to assure that this will be the case. 
The first area of general concern is the relationship between market efficiency and how FDI 
affects both short or static and long run market efficiency. This has rarely been addressed in 
the empirical literature in concrete and practical ways. For Poland it was found that especially 
the selling of assets to owners abroad did not raise concerns for short run market efficiency. 
However, this result may in some ways be peculiar to the specific polish institutional context 
and Poland’s transition path. Privatization in Poland has followed a gradualist approach and 
privatization has been high quality in the sense that a relatively large amount of resources 
have been invested in the matching of assets to be privatized with that of new and more 
efficient owners. Social concerns and short run job protection has played a considerable role 
in these negotiations. Different institutional contexts should be studied to better understand 
the implications of FDI for market efficiency. 
 
One potential area of concern with respect to market efficiency is the large gap in capital 
intensity across foreign and domestic held firms which could be a signal that barriers to entry 
are increasing over time. Hence market efficiency outcomes need to be monitored on a 
continuous basis. When rebates or discounts on taxes or investments are given policy-
makers should be concerned that such schemes are available equally to all firms. 




With respect to spillover effects the study shows that there may be a high element of 
antagonism and rivalry across ownership groups. This may be in particular true for long run 
performance or firm growth. To maximize spillovers policy-makers should support institutions 
and initiatives that will reduce the tendency of advancement of one ownership group at the 
expense of the other. No doubt socialization and communication have a large bearing on 
spillover effects also in industrial communities. Although not addressed in this study, barriers 
to communication, such as language and cultural differences, are among the most important 
to be removed.  
The results on spillovers and competition documented in the present research should be 
complemented by results focusing on particular industry cases whereby it will be possible to 
measure the evolution in efficiency, markup levels, competition and spillover effects in more 
exact ways. Partly the problems incurred in the present research can also be resolved by 
using panels where the time dimension takes greater prominence in the results. Other long 
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APPENDIX 1.  
 
Methodologies used to estimate Total Factor Productivity 
 
Two different methods towards estimating total factor productivity have been used, re. 
TFPOLS (the OLS method) and TFPLP (the Levinsohn-Petrin method) reported in the paper.  
 
Following the literature on estimates of total factor productivity, the OLS estimates may be 
seriously biased due to problems of simultaneity (Olley and Pakes, 1996, Levinsohn and 
Petrin, 2003).  
 
Under the OLS method TFP is calculated as the residual under the BLUE assumptions (error 
terms are serially uncorrelated, homoscedastic and reflect random and unobserved shocks 
that are i.i.d. ): 
iat a iat a iat a iat iat iat m l k y y y γ β α ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ − − − = −    (A1.1) 
 
Where output y is sales revenue (when materials are included otherwise value added), k is 
capital, l is labor and m is material inputs. (Small letters denote logarithmic transformation.) 
 
The problem of simultaneity is widely discussed and addressed in the literature. It arises 
because if productivity shocks are partially and differently observed by managers across 
firms it may violate the BLUE assumptions. For example assume ω in this production 
function is observed by managers before deciding inputs and hence error terms are no 
longer i.i.d.: 
 
t t t t t t m l k y ε ω γ β α χ + + + + + = 0    (A1.1) 
 
One way to approach the problem is to use semi-parametric estimation techniques. Olley 
and Pakes (1996) introduce the first attempt using inputs of capital as a proxy for the 
observed part of the productivity shock. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) correct the Olley and 
Pakes method in view to non-linearity in the investment function suggesting instead usage of 
variable inputs such as materials or energy as a proxy for the observed part of the 
productivity shock. Estimates of α,  β and γ in A1.1 are now obtained using that ω is a 
function of the inputs of capital and materials. 




It has been documented that with the OLS approach the productivity parameters for labor 
and other variable inputs such a materials have been overestimated, whereas the parameter 
for capital tends to be underestimated. On balance Petrin et al. (2004) show that economies 
of scale are exaggerated by OLS and hence total factor productivity is underestimated. 
 
The routine is fairly complex and described in detail in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and 
Petrin et al. (2004). However, it can easily be implemented in STATA invoking the LEVPET 
routine if first installed. The approach used here is based on the production function in its net 
form (using value added as dependent variable) and using the default set up (two lags for 
instruments and the nl command as minimizing routine). 
 
Under the OLS method the parameters can be estimated with one expanded equation 
rendering the same results as estimating the production function separately by industry and 
ownership groups. Under the LP method parameters must be obtained by estimating it 
separately by industry  
 
Comparative parameter estimates are reported in Table A1.1. and the estimated Kernel 
distributions of obtained TFP by ownership classes are reported with Figures A.1.1 and A.1.2 
respectively. 
 
It should be noted that the Levinsohn-Petrin procedure has higher computational 
requirements in terms of numbers of observations needed to obtain reliable parameter 
estimates. Hence it is not possible to calculate productivity parameters and residuals (TFP) 
for all industries and ownership groups separately for this specific dataset. Furthermore, 
productivity parameters vary at least as much with asset history as by ownership group in 
this specific panel. Instead common parameters are estimated by industry under this method 
and the remaining heterogeneity is addressed with the subsequent equations as reported in 
the paper. This is not an optimal but necessary solution due to the relatively low number of 
observations available for many industries in the study. The alternative approach being 
excluding industries selectively could raise other issues of selection bias. 
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TABLE A1.1. Productivity estimates by industry, ownership and method   
 
   OLS  Method     Levinsohn-Petrin  Method 
   Dep.  var.  is  sales     Dep  var.  is  value  added 
Industry and owner  log K  log L  log M  ES (K+L)  log K  log L    ES  
15  -  Food  DOM  0.39 0.34 0.55 0.73   0.27 0.53   0.80 
    FOR 0.42 0.33 0.51 0.75   - 
17  –  Textile  DOM  0.58 0.38 0.30 0.96   0.42 0.52   0.94 
    FOR 0.58 0.26 0.38 0.84   - 
18 – Clothing  DOM  0.24  0.57  0.57 0.81   0.21 0.51   0.72 
    FOR 0.35 0.39 0.62 0.74   - 
19  -  Leather DOM  0.61 0.51 0.24 1.12   0.54 0.30   0.84 
    FOR 0.78 -0.38  0.63 0.40   - 
20  –  Wood  DOM  0.41 0.49 0.46 0.90   0.44 0.58   1.02 
    FOR 0.61 0.18 0.40 0.79   - 
21  -  Paper  DOM  0.48 0.23 0.54 0.71   0.43 0.46   0.89 
    FOR 0.27 0.29 0.66 0.56   - 
22  –  Printing DOM  0.21 0.82 0.52 1.03   0.12 0.57   0.69 
    FOR 0.56 0.63 0.29 1.19   - 
24  -  Chemical  DOM  0.60 0.16 0.44 0.76   0.29 0.42   0.71 
    FOR 0.38 0.27 0.59 0.65   - 
25  –  Plastic  DOM  0.40 0.52 0.44 0.92   0.24 0.48   0.72 
    FOR 0.41 0.46 0.46 0.87   - 
26  –  Mineral    DOM  0.57 0.32 0.38 0.89   0.22 0.45   0.67 
    FOR 0.54 0.45 0.27 0.99   - 
27  –  Metal  DOM  0.39 0.26 0.53 0.65   -0.04  0.51   0.47 
    FOR 0.56 -0.03  0.54 0.53   - 
28  -  Metallurgy  DOM  0.25 0.60 0.55 0.85   0.20 0.59   0.79 
    FOR 0.38 0.59 0.43 0.97   - 
29  –  Machinery  DOM  0.24 0.76 0.42 1.00   0.28 0.50   0.78 
    FOR 0.41 0.20 0.61 0.61   - 
31  –  El.  Mach.  DOM  0.18 0.89 0.46 1.07   0.04 0.49   0.53 
    FOR 0.44 0.17 0.57 0.61   - 
32 – Radio, TV DOM  0.25  0.43  0.65 0.68   0.11 0.44   0.55 
    FOR 0.90 0.07 0.21 0.97   - 
33  –  Prec.Mach.DOM  0.05 0.59 0.74 0.64   0.16 0.38   0.54 
    FOR 0.66 -0.18  0.61 0.48   - 
34 – Vehicles   DOM  0.43  0.52  0.38 0.95   0.40 0.40   0.80 
    FOR 0.43 0.33 0.48 0.76   - 
35  –  O.  Transp.  DOM  0.30 0.69 0.39 0.99   0.63 0.41   1.04 
    FOR 0.63 0.48 0.16 1.11   - 
36 – Furniture  DOM  0.30  0.51  0.53 0.81   0.24 0.39   0.63 
    FOR 0.42 0.24 0.55 0.66   - 
37 – Recycling  DOM  0.31  0.42  0.64 0.73   -0.04  0.83   0.79 
  FOR  0.45  0.56  0.41  1.01    -     
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APPENDIX 2.  
 
About the data 
 
TABLE A2.1. Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation coefficients        
 
Calculated in STATA on full sample 
 
       1.  2.  3.  4.  5. 6. 7. 8.    9. 10.  11.  12. 
     
1. COMP (number of)    Mean    166     
   SD   (143)   1.00   
2. CAPITAL (thous. PLN)    19,901   
     (91,205) -0.097  1.00   
3. DOM (dummy)      0.67 
     (0.47)   0.023  -0.101  1.00 
4. SHAREFOR (share)      0.34 
     (0.22)   -0.151  0.031  -0.178  1.00 
5. LABOUR (number of)    323  
     (746)   -0.083  0.778  -0.036  -0.055  1.00 
6. MATCOST (thous. PLN)    25,816  
     (160,979)  -0.070  0.766  -0.123  0.062  0.690  1.00 
7. MARKUP (ratio)      1.06  
     (0.22)   -0.009  0.009  -0.003  0.050  -0.016  0.004  1.00 
8. OLD (dummy)      0.41 
     (0.49)   -0.093  0.099  0.164 -0.053  0.202 0.053 -0.029  1.00 
9.  ROA  (ratio)     0.57 
     (7.88)   0.006  -0.012  0.029  0.015  -0.018 -0.006 0.065  -0.027 1.00 
10. SALES (thous. PLN)    47,912  
     (156,654)  -0.089  0.818  -0.151  0.064 0.730 0.944 0.016 0.090 -0.080  1.00   
11. TFPLP (parameter)     212.15 
     (757.63) -0.143  0.499  -0.114  0.056 0.493 0.430 0.032 0.028 0.032 0.486 1.00 
12. TFPOLS (parameter)    2.15 
     (6.29)   -0.007  -0.047  0.020  0.004  -0.076 -0.050 0.037  -0.092 0.180  -0.035 0.094  1.00   
 
    